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I. INTRODUCTION
“THESE GUYS TALKING HERE ACT AS THOUGH THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT PART OF THEIR
LIVES. T HEY MAY WISH IT WEREN ’ T, BUT IT IS. AS WE APPROACH THE ISSUES THEY DEBATED
HERE TODAY, THEY HAD BETTER BELIEVE THAT THOSE ISSU ES WILL BE DEBATED BY THE
WHOLE COUNTRY . T HE MAJORITY OF AMERICANS WILL NOT SIMPLY SIT STILL WHILE SOME
ELITE STRIPS OFF THE IR PERSONALITIES AND UPLOADS THEMSELVES INTO THEIR CYBE RSPACE PARADISE . T HEY WILL HAVE SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THAT. T HERE WILL BE A
VEHEMENT DEBATE ABOUT THAT IN THIS COUNTRY.” LEON FUERTH , FORMER NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR TO VICE P RESIDENT ALBERT GORE , JR.1

The conversation that Leon Fuerth called for is now underway.
Molecular nanotechnology is a technology so new that, in truth, it
barely exists. Although the actual accomplishments of nanotechnology at this date tend to fall into the workbench or proof-of-concept
stage, research continues to progress at a speed that outpaces the predictions of the most optimistic prognosticators.2 Indeed, nanotechnology has received so much attention — not all of it positive 3 — that
some are already pronouncing it a cliché. 4 If the rapid pace of research
continues, however, nanotechnology will hit the marketplace more
quickly than did biotechnology, a field of endeavor to which society is
still adjusting.
1. Leon Fuerth, Remarks at the Foresight Senior Associate Gathering (Apr. 28 2002),
quoted in Ronald Bailey, What’s the purpose of life?: Nanotechnology Might Provide the
Answer, REASON ONLINE , ¶ 19 (May 1, 2002), at http://reason.com/rb/rb050102.shtml.
2. See, e.g., Philip Ball, DNA Construction Business: DNA Could Help Build
NanoMachines Made of DNA, NATURE SCI. UPDATE (May 1, 2002), at
http://www.nature.com/nsu/020429/020429-5.html (describing nanostructures and motors
built with DNA); Kelly Morris, Macrodoctor, Come Meet the Nanodoctors, 357 LANCET
778 (2001) (describing progress in medical nanotechnology); see also Researchers Assem ble Molecular Gear: University of Tokyo Team Scores First by Building Functional Nanodevice, NIKKEI WKLY ., Mar. 19, 2001, at 11; Fiona Harvey, Toughened by
NanoTechnology, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 15, 2001, at 15. For an extensive overview of
medical nanotechnology, see ROBERT A. FREITAS JR., NANOMEDICINE, VOLUME I: BASIC
CAPABILITIES (1999). Indeed, nanotechnology’s importance to medicine is such that The
Lancet is publishing a special issue devoted to the topic. See Nanomedicine: Grounds for
Optimism, and a Call for Papers, 362 LANCET 673 (2003). Military nanotechnology is also
of growing interest to the Pentagon. See Chappell Brown, Nanotech Goes to War, ELECTRONIC ENGINEERING T IMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 18.
3. Nanotechnology has already been denounced by anti-technology activists such as Jeremy Rifkin and Kirkpatrick Sale. See Ronald Bailey, Rebels Against the Future: Witnessing
the Birth of the Global Anti-Technology Movement, REASON ONLINE , ¶ 2 (Feb. 28, 2001), at
http://reason.com/rb/rb022801.html. The debate over nanotechnology has also figured in the
Michael Crichton novel, Prey. MICHAEL CRICHTON , P REY (2002). For a skeptical review of
Crichton’s nano-villains, see Freeman J. Dyson, The Future Needs Us!, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Feb. 13, 2003, at 53.
4. See Gail Collins, Bring On the Nanobots, N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 16, 2001, at A23.
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The “vehement debate” that Leon Fuerth predicted has just now
begun. The time where nanotechnology was seen as too exotic for
general discussion has passed, and a number of significant leaders,
including Britain’s Prince Charles, have expressed growing concerns
over nanotechnology, “grey goo,” and the future of humanity.5 The
evolving discussion over nanotechnology mirrors the current debate
over cloning, a technology considered pure science fiction a short
time ago. As the cloning debate has taught us, the discussions over
nanotechnology should begin sooner rather than later, because as the
debate grows more intense and as the science approaches feasibility, it
becomes more difficult to think carefully about the issues involved.
This Article outlines the basic characteristics of nanotechnology
as it is currently understood and will briefly describe some of the
technical — and social — consequences likely to arise as nanotechnology matures. Next, it examines three potential approaches for regulating nanotechnology and the likely consequences of each. The
Article concludes with suggestions for further study, as well as a list
of “dos” and “don’ts” for regulating nanotechnology.

II. A BEGINNER’S GUIDE TO NANOTECHNOLOGY
A. How Nanotechnology Works
Put simply, nanotechnology is the science and technology of
building things from the bottom up — one atom or molecule at a time.
In contrast, traditional industrial technologies operate from the top
down. Blocks or chunks of raw material are cast, sawed, or machined
into precisely-formed products by removing unwanted matter until
only the desired configuration remains. Results of such processes may
be rather small (e.g., integrated circuits with structures measured in
microns) or very large (e.g., ocean liners or jumbo jets). However, in
all top-down processes, matter is being processed in chunks far larger
than molecular scale. 6
This top-down technology is familiar to most people and is certainly capable of yielding products of fairly high precision and complexity. This method does differ, however, from the natural processes
of the world, since most products of living organisms — to say nothing of those organisms themselves — are produced in a far different
manner.

5. See Mark Welland, Don’t Be Afraid of the Grey Goo, FIN. T IMES (London), Apr. 30,
2003, at 21; see also infra text accompanying note 37.
6. See K. Eric Drexler, Nanotechnology Summary in 1990 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
SCIENCE AND THE FUTURE YEARBOOK 162, 163–67 (describing top-down and bottom-up
approaches).
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Rather than being produced through the shaping and molding of
large chunks of material, most objects on Earth are constructed by
tiny molecular machines, such as cells and organelles, working from
the bottom up. By organizing individual atoms and molecules into
particular configurations, these molecular machines can create objects
of astonishing complexity and size, such as the human brain, a coral
reef, or a redwood tree.7 This approach produces results that would
seem impossible if judged by the standards of conventional top-down
production technology (e.g., no one could “build ” a tree using topdown methods). Despite this discrepancy, most bottom-up processes
are taken entirely for granted. For example, the human body begins as
a single cell, a fertilized ovum, but evolves into a mature human being
consisting of approximately 75 trillion complexly-arranged cells.8 The
molecular machinery responsible for this amazing, though commonplace, feat of production is capable of such results because it performs
operations in parallel (that is, with many cells operating at the same
time through most of the growth process) and from the bottom up.
This process thus serves as a kind of “existence proof” for nanotec hnology. As Eric Drexler states:
Nature shows that molecules can serve as machines
because living things work by means of such machinery. Enzymes are molecular machines that make,
break, and rearrange the bonds holding other molecules together. Muscles are driven by molecular machines that haul fibers past one another. DNA serves
as a data-storage system, transmitting digital instructions to molecular machines, the ribosomes, that
manufacture protein molecules. And these protein
molecules, in turn, make up most of the molecular
machinery just described.9
Of course, putting these natural molecular machines to work is
nothing new, as every living thing does so constantly. Nor is deliberate human programming of those machines particularly new, as this
forms the basis of genetic engineering. 10 What differentiates
nanotechnology is its attempt to go beyond the capabilities of natural
mechanisms. Using special bacterium-sized “assembler” devices,
nanotechnology permits exact control of molecular structures that are
7. See id. at 175.
8. ARTHUR C. GUYTON, TEXTBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSIOLOGY 2 (7th ed. 1986).
9. Drexler, supra note 6, at 162.
10. See R. Williamson, Molecular Biology in Relation to Medical Genetics, in 1 PRINCIPLES AND P RACTICE OF MEDICAL GENETICS 16, 17–18 (Alan E. H. Emery & David L. Rimoin eds., 1983).

** DRAFT **
Do not reference - formatting and pagination
may not correspond to printed version

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=962589

No. 1]

Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy

183

not readily manipulable by organic means (e.g., diamond or heavy
metals) on a programmable basis.11 As Rice University nanotechnologist Vicki Colvin notes:
Nanomaterials are different. Because of their small
size, we are able to get them into parts of the body
where typical inorganic materials can’t go because
they’re too big. There is an enormous advantage to
using nanoparticles if you’re engineering, for example, drug delivery systems or cancer therapeutics.12
More advanced plans involve going beyond nanomaterials to
nanodevices. With nanotechnology, atoms will be specifically placed
and connected, all at a rapid pace, in a manner similar to processes
found in living organisms. Trees, mammals, and far less complex organisms make use of molecular machinery to manufacture and undertake repairs at a cellular and subcellular level. The future of
nanotechnology depends on the development of processes that can
control placement of individual atoms to form products of great complexity on an extremely small scale. 13
This approach was originally suggested by physicist Richard
Feynman. In an article entitled There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom,
Feynman explores the potential of atomic -scale physical manipulation
of matter.14 As Feynman writes:
The principles of physics, as far as I can see, do not
speak against the possibility of maneuvering things
atom by atom. . . . [I]t would be, in principle, possible . . . for a physicist to synthesize any chemical
substance that the chemist writes down. . . . How?
Put the atoms down where the chemist says, and so
you make the substance. The problems of chemistry
and biology can be greatly helped if our ability to see
11. See K. ERIC DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS: MOLECULAR MACHINERY, MANUFACTURING,
AND COMPUTATION 10, 13, 255 (1992); see also Drexler, supra note 6, at 170.
12. David Rotman, Measuring the Risks of Nanotechnology, TECH . REV., Apr. 2003, at
71.
13. See New Technologies for a Sustainable World: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Science, Technology and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. 21 (1992) (testimony of Dr. Eric Drexler) [hereinafter New Technologies
Hearing] (“The basis of this technology, as I said, is building with molecular building
blocks and precise positional control. This molecule-by-molecule control can become the
basis of a manufacturing technology that is cleaner and more efficient than anything we
know today. It is a fundamentally different way of processing matter to make products that
people want.”); see also DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 1–5.
14. Richard P. Feynman, There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom, in MINIATURIZATION
282 (Horace D. Gilbert ed., 1961).
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what we are doing, and to do things on an atomic
level is ultimately developed — a development
which I think cannot be avoided.15
Scientists and researchers continue to make progress in this direction. By the early nineties, IBM’s research division had already demonstrated the ability to manipulate individual atoms, using the tip of
an atomic force microscope to construct a copy of IBM’s logo out of
xenon atoms.16 The next step, the precise placement of atoms in combination to form stable compounds and structures,17 has also been
achieved.18
Such efforts have already generated substantial theoretical literature and considerable scholarly interest. Nanotechnology has produced a number of books and articles,19 government reports,20 and at
least one long-established and well-funded research program — unfortunately in Japan 21 rather than the United States. However, the
United States is now forging ahead with its own National Nanotechnology Initiative. 22
15. Id. at 295–96.
16. See K. ERIC DREXLER ET AL ., UNBOUNDING THE FUTURE : THE NANOTECHNOLOGY
REVOLUTION 96–98 (1991).
17. See id . at 97–98.
18. See Ball, supra note 2.
19. See, e.g., ROBERT A. FREITAS JR., NANOMEDICINE VOLUME ONE : BASIC CAPABILI TIES (1999); K. E RIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION (rev. ed. 1990) (the first book-length
treatment of the subject); DREXLER ET AL., UNBOUNDING THE FUTURE, supra note 16, (the
most popularly-oriented treatment); K. ERIC DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS: MOLECULAR MACHINERY, MANUFACTURING, AND COMPUTATION (1992) (the most technically -oriented of
the three Drexler books); PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST FORESIGHT CONFERENCE ON
NANOTECHNOLOGY (B.C. Crandall & James Lewis eds., 1991). Articles include The Invisible Factory, ECON ., Dec. 9, 1989, at 91 (a clear, nontechnical account of nanotechnology);
E. Pennisi, Molecular Tools for Nanomanufacturing, SCI. NEWS, Nov. 21, 1992, at 343;
Christine L. Peterson, Nanotechnology: Evolution of the Concept, 45 J. BRIT. I NTERPLANETARY SOC. 395 (1992); Ralph Merkle, Self Replicating Systems and Molecular Manufactu ring, 45 J. BRIT. I NTERPLANETARY SOC. 407 (1992); Paul Saffo, Think Small and
Mechanical, PERS . COMPUTING , Sept. 1989, at 219; Harvey Newquist, Computers Smaller
Than a Fly, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 15, 1988, at 19.
20. See, e.g., W HITE HOUSE OFFICE OF SCI. AND T ECH. POLICY , SCIENCE ANDTECHNOLOGY : A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 170 (1993); U.S. CONG ., OFFICE OF T ECH . ASSESSMENT,
MINIATURIZATION TECHNOLOGIES 20–22 (1991) (describing nanotechnology and its strat egic importance).
21. Japan’s program is very long-established indeed. See Teri Sprackland, Mini-Sensors
Stake Out Mega-Markets, ELECTRONIC BUS., Feb. 10, 1992, at 53 (reporting that Japan’s
Ministry of International Trade and Industry is funding research into nanotechnology in the
amount of $200 million). For some of the recent fruit of this emphasis, see Researchers
Assemble Molecular Gear, supra note 2.
22. See NATIONAL NANOTECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE , at http://www.nano.gov (last visited
Nov. 20, 2003). Furthermore, at the time of this writing, a bill authorizing nearly $3.7 billion for nanotechnology research and development is awaiting signature by President Bush.
21st Century Nanotechnology Research and Development Act, S. 189, 108th Cong. (2003);
see also Jeff Karoub, U.S. House Sends Nanotechnology Bill to Bush for Expected Signa-
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B. What Nanotechnology Can Do
Full-fledged nanotechnology promises nothing less than complete
control over the physical structure of matter — the same kind of control over the molecular and structural makeup of physical objects that
a word processor provides over the form and content of a text. The
implications of such capabilities are significant. To dramatize only
slightly, they are comparable to producing a 747 or an ocean liner
from piles of the most basic materials (e.g., raw iron) and the mechanical equivalent of a single fertilized egg.
Using nanotechnology, production would be carried out by large
numbers of tiny devices operating in parallel, in a fashion similar to
the molecular machinery already found in living organisms.23 However, these nanodevices would not suffer from the constraints facing
living organisms — they would not have to be made of protein or
other substances readily extractable from the natural environment, nor
would they have to be capable of reproducing themselves. Instead, the
nanodevices could be constructed of whatever material, and in whatever fashion, is most suited to their task. Known as “assemblers,”
these tiny devices would be capable of manipulating individual molecules rapidly and precisely. 24 Since the process of using such assemblers to manufacture products may be difficult for many readers to
visualize, I have formulated an example of how this technology could
work.
Currently, scientists produce certain medicines through biotechnological processes, such as those using recombinant DNA. 25 In esture, SMALL T IMES (Nov. 20, 2003), at http://www.smalltimes.com/document_
display.cfm?document_id=6981.
23. See New Technologies Hearing, supra note 13, at 21 (“In working with molecular
building blocks, it resembles processes we see in farms and in forests and, like those processes, rather than consuming fossil fuels and emitting CO2, it can take sunlight and CO2
and convert them into products, acting as a net CO2 consumer.”). Cf. GUYTON, supra note
8, at 35–37 (describing processes used by organic cells).
24. As Eric Drexler describes them:
These assemblers will work fast. A fast enzyme, such as carbonic anhydrase or ketosteroid isomerase, can process almost a million molecules per second, even without conveyors and power-driven
mechanisms to slap a new molecule into place as soon as an old one
is released. . . . An assembler arm will be about fifty million times
shorter than a human arm, and so (as it turns out) it will be able to
move back and forth about fifty million times more rapidly. For an
assembler arm to move a mere million times per second would be like
a human arm moving about once per minute: sluggish.
DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION , supra note 19, at 56–63.
25. See, e.g., E.D.P. De Robertis & E.M.F. De Robertis, Jr., The Genetic Code and Genetic Engineering, in CELL AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 522–24 (1987). Examples of such
recombinant DNA products include human insulin, interferon, human growth hormone,
Hepatitis B vaccines, and certain coagulation factors, all of which are currently clinically
available. See id. Indeed, such products are ubiquitous and are regularly prescribed by physicians.
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sence, this means that the DNA of living creatures (usually bacteria)
is altered so that the creatures are reprogrammed to produce the desired substance. This approach represents a revolution in pharmaceutical technology, but has distinct limitations. Since biotechnology
operates by altering the program of living organisms, only those substances that can be handled by living organisms can be manufactured,
and only those mechanisms possessed by living organisms can be
used. To understand this limitation, imagine that clothing could only
be manufactured by training spiders and silkworms to weave their
product in particular patterns. By contrast, modern textile technology
provides a far more powerful, more versatile, and easier approach to
manufacturing clothing. Nanotechnology represents a similar approach to the manufacture of other goods, including pharmaceuticals.
Imagine the power and complexity of today’s computer-driven textile
looms put into machines many times smaller than the period at the
end of this sentence. Instead of weaving cloth, such machines would
seize individual atoms using selectively sticky manipulator arms, then
“plug” those atoms together (somewhat like assembling Lego blocks)
until chemical bonding took place.26 By repeating these steps according to a programmed set of instructions, a nanotechnological approach
would be able to synthesize materials at greater speed and lower
cost.27 Also, such an approach would produce substances that conventional biotechnology could not — because they either are toxic to living organisms or are comprised of elements that living organisms
cannot handle efficiently. 28 As the molecules desired grew more complex, the advantage gained by their use would continue to increase.
With relatively mature technology, one might expect to see general-purpose chemical synthesizers using nanotechnology. The desired
molecule would be modeled on a computer screen, the assemblers
would be provided with the proper raw materials, and the product
would be available in minutes. More complex applications might use
groups of assemblers programmed to produce molecules and then
hook them together into large structures: rocket engines, computer
chips, or whatever else may be desired.29
Besides allowing such efficient and powerful manufacturing capabilities, more sophisticated applic ations of nanotechnology would
allow far more subtle applications. For example, specially designed
nanodevices, the size of bacteria, might be programmed to destroy
arterial plaque, or fight cancer cells, or repair cellular damage caused

26. See DREXLER, NANOSYSTEMS, supra note 11, at 181, 197–207 (discussing “chemical
mechanosynthesis”).
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION , supra note 19, at 60–62.
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by aging. 30 After performing their tasks, the devices could be induced
to self-destruct, or remain in a surveillance mode, or, in some cases,
integrate themselves into the body’s cells.31
In addition to treating diseases, there is no reason why nanotechnology could not integrate networks of distributed sensors into the
human body, providing drastically enhanced mental, physical, and
sensory abilities. In addition, substantial changes in human morphology would be possible for practical purposes (e.g., greatly enhanced
musculature and height or underwater breathing 32 ) or for more whimsically cosmetic purposes (e.g., ornamental wings or decorative tails).
Some experts believe that highly intelligent nanodevices distributed
throughout the brain may permit copying of thought patterns — in
essence, mind uploading — so that a copy of a person’s personality
and memories could be placed in storage, or even run as a form of
naturally-created artificial intelligence. 33
As Leon Fuerth notes in the passage quoted at the beginning of
this Article, such capabilities would undoubtedly lead to considerable
discussion and calls for regulation. The remainder of this Article will
examine potential regulatory environments and the consequences associated with each.

III. REGULATORY RESPONSES
Technologies with dramatic societal implications tend to generate
strong pressures for some degree of regulation. Currently, controversial technologies such as genetic engineering and cloning exemplify
the heightened debate surrounding new technologies.34 While
nanotechnology may not generate the same passionate debate of these
other technologies, it has been — as previously mentioned — been
the target of a number of anti-technology activists.35 As nanotechnology continues to advance and expand into the mainstream, an increas30. See DREXLER ET AL., UNBOUNDING THE FUTURE , supra note 16, at 210, 212–13, 224.
31. See id. at 209.
32. See ROBERT A. FREITAS, JR., A MECHANICAL ARTIFICIAL RED CELL: EXPLORATORY
DESIGN IN MEDICAL NANOTECHNOLOGY (speculating about oxygen-storing “respirocytes”
that would permit extended underwater stays without scuba equipment), available at
http://www.foresight.org/Nanomedicine/Respirocytes.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
33. See ROBERT A. FREITAS, JR., MIND UPLOADING (collecting list of papers and links on
the topic), available at http://www.foresight.org/Nanomedicine/Uploading.html (last visited
Nov. 20, 2003); see also Raymond Kurzweil, Live Forever, PSYCHOL . TODAY , Jan./Feb.
2000 (predicting that “[w]ithin 30 years, we will be able to scan ourselves — our intelligence, personalities, feelings and memories — into computers”), available at
http://www.psychologytoday.com/htdocs/prod/ptoarticle/pto-20000101-000037.asp.
34. Compare FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, OUR POSTHUMAN FUTURE : CONSEQUENCES OF THE
BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION (2003) (generally negative view) with GREGORY STOCK ,
REDESIGNING HUMANS: OUR INEVITABLE GENETIC FUTURE (2002) (generally positive
view).
35. See discussion supra note 3.
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ing number of people can be expected to show interest in its regulation.
Regulatory responses to nanotechnology could fall along a broad
spectrum, ranging from complete relinquishment or prohibition, to
permissible use only in military programs, to more moderate regulation, to laissez-faire. As discussed below, each approach presents its
own difficulties for implementation, and its own likely consequences
for the future of nanotechnology.
A. “Relinquishment” and Prohibition
Some anti-technology activists may already believe that the risks
posed by nanotechnology — either in terms of physical harm or in
terms of societal change — are sufficiently great that we should pursue a Barney Fife regulatory strategy: “nip it in the bud.”36 Only by
preventing any nanotechnology research at the outset, they argue, can
the consequences that they regard as undesirable be prevented. This
approach will most likely appeal to opponents of technological development in general, as well as to others who believe that once
nanotechnology appears likely to produce substantial social benefits,
it will become more difficult to stop.
Though, as discussed further below, such an approach seems
plainly unworkable, the concerns that motivate calls for prohibition do
have some rational basis. The potential beneficial uses of nanotechnology could also be manipulated for malicious purposes. The same
technology that could selectively destroy cancer cells could instead
target immune or nerve cells, producing death or further debility. Selfreproducing robots (“replicators”) could turn everything else in the
world into copies of themselves (the so-called “grey goo” problem),
thus ending life as we know it. 37 Nanotechnology, while having the
potential to dramatically increase computing power, might, therefore,
also give rise to artificial intelligence that could threaten humanity.
1. The Case for Prohibition: Children of Our Minds
This latter fear has been examined, with differing degrees of concern, by Sun Microsystems’s Chief Scientist, Bill Joy, in his essay,

36. See generally Bailey, supra note 3. See also T V LAND , CITIZENS OF MAYBERRY, at
http://www.tvland.com/shows/griffith/citizens/index.jhtml (last visited Nov. 20, 2003).
37. On further examination, the “grey goo” problem appears to be less fearsome than
originally imagined: it turns out to be virtually impossible to occur by accident and quite
difficult to bring about on purpose. See ROBERT A. FREITAS JR., SOME LIMITS TO GLOBAL
ECOPHAGY BY BIOVOROUS REPLICATORS, WITH PUBLIC P OLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
(2000), at http://www.foresight.org/NanoRev/Ecophagy.html.
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Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, 38 and by Ray Kurzweil in his book,
The Age of Spiritual Machines.39 Kurzweil views the prospect of human-like, and human-superior, artif icial intelligence with equanimity.
In his book, a person traveling into the future checks in with a woman
over a period of several decades, only to find her growing more and
more indistinguishable from the machines that are her servants.40 At
the end, she seems to have blended with them in a fashion that she, at
least, finds entirely acceptable. 41 Just as we are, in some sense, commensal organisms formed by the blending of many prehistorically
independent entities (e.g., the mitochondria in our cells), she has become a new kind of organism, synthesizing human and machine.
Kurzweil’s future is alien, but it is not, at least in his view, entirely
dystopian.42
Joy, who gained inspiration from Kurzweil’s work, sees the future
in less felicitous terms.43 He fears that intelligent machines will, as a
consequence of their greater intelligence, become competitors of humanity, and by virtue of their intelligence, outcompete us into extinction.44 Joy concludes that we may have to “relinquish” research in
some areas in order to prevent such an outcome, even if this means
condemning some people to deaths that could have been prevented
through more advanced technology.45
It is not obvious, however, that intelligence has much to do with
world domination. Certainly, those currently ruling the world did not
attain their positions by virtue of their intelligence, and it may be that,
like James Branch Cabell’s eponymous protagonist Jurgen, superintelligent machines would find that “cleverness was not at the top of
things, and never had been.”46 While scientists and computer experts,
38. Bill Joy, Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us, W IRED 238, Apr. 2000, available at
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/8.04/joy.html.
39. RAY KURZWEIL , THE AGE OF SPIRITUAL MACHINES: W HEN COMPUTERS EXCEED
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (1999).
40. See id .
41. See id .
42. See id .
43. See Joy, supra note 38.
44. See id.
45. See Richard Scheinin, Guiding Science: Technologist Bill Joy Leads a Debate Over
How Far We Should Go With New Machines, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS 1F, ¶¶ 1, 3 (Feb.
17, 2001) (“Perhaps science should stop manipulating genes, [Joy] suggested, even if new
gene therapies might save a child from incurable cancer. . . . ‘I could imagine letting someone suffer to protect the group.’”).
46. JAMES BRANCH CABELL , JURGEN : A COMEDY OF JUSTICE 332 (1934). In the text,
Jurgen has just met Koshchei the Deathless, “who made things as they are.” Id. The full
passage reads:
And of a sudden Jurgen perceived that this Koshchei the Deathless
was not particularly intelligent. Then Jurgen wondered why he should
ever have expected Koshchei to be intelligent? Koshchei was omnipotent, as men estimate omnipotence: but by what course of reasoning had people come to believe that Koshchei was clever, as men
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whose chief pride (as with Jurgen) lies in their intelligence, would
tend to regard superior intellect as the sine qua non of power, this
view can be quickly dispelled by a glance at the headlines.
2. Problems with Turning a Blind Eye
Regardless of these quibbles, however, Joy’s proposal, and in particular his suggestion that we may need to relinquish certain lines of
research entirely, has received a great deal of attention. Though Joy
may have backtracked somewhat,47 others have taken up his call for
limits on scientific research. Yet, if anything about the future of technology — or for that matter, its past — is clear, it is that such an approach cannot possibly work, even if, as it must, it moves from a
voluntary program of “relinquishment” to a draconian program of
prohibition.
The relinquishment approach was originally taken by nanotechnology pioneer K. Eric Drexler, whose first reaction when considering
the implications of nanotechnology was guarded silence, for fear that
it could potentially lead to great dangers.48 Drexler, however, soon
recognized that if he could think of such an idea, others could as well.
(Indeed, Drexler later discovered that the basic principles of
nanotechnology had been anticipated by Richard Feynman decades
earlier.)49 Thus, Drexler concluded that the only responsible approach
was to guide the inevitable development of nanotechnology in constructive directions.50
The basic ideas of nanotechnology are now in general circulation.
A ban on nanotechnology could thus only be accomplished by banning research and development, rather than discussion. To have any
chance of success, such a ban would have to be comprehensive and
draconian. However, even then it would face at least four insuperable
problems: definition, concealment, bureaucracy, and perfection.
The first problem would be in formulating an exact definition of
nanotechnology. At present, researchers in search of funding have
estimate cleverness? The fact that, to the contrary, Koshchei seemed
well-meaning, but rather slow of apprehension and a little needlessly
fussy, went far toward explaining a host of matters which had long
puzzled Jurgen. Cleverness was of course, the most admirable of all
traits: but cleverness was not at the top of things, and never had been.
Id. Jurgen, who has always prided himself on his cleverness, learns much from this encounter.
47. According to reports in October 2000, Joy qualified somewhat his calls for a relinquishment of research. See Patrick McGee, Bill Joy Hopes Reason Prevails, W IRED NEWS
(Oct. 30, 2000), at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,39864,00.html. On the
other hand, more recent accounts suggest that he is calling for such a relinquishment, after
all. See Scheinin, supra note 45, at 1F.
48. See ED REGIS, NANO 58–62 (1995).
49. See id .
50. Id. at 90–91.
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tended to define “nanotechnology” rather broadly, including such
things as molecular electronics and even high-resolution photolithography. Nanotechnology generally consists of the mechanical manipulation of atoms and molecules at a nanometer scale, but the term as
generally used in nanotechnology circles has become more specified,
and usually includes only particular methods of manipulation done
with particular goals in mind.
Yet, a nanotechnology-prohibition regime that banned only the
construction of, for example, assembler devices, would exempt from
regulation huge amounts of research that could be readily translatable
into such devices. The resulting prohibition regime would merely
drive the final stages of nanotechnology work underground.
On the other hand, a broader regime of nanotechnology regulation
would encompass everything from high-precision chip manufacturing
to many aspects of biotechnology, creating enormous barriers to progress across a wide range of technical fields. While Luddites 51 might
view such side effects as beneficial, rather than detrimental, society as
a whole is unlikely to agree.
A second problem with a prohibitionist approach is the ease with
which nanotechnology research can proceed using inconspicuous
tools in concealable locations. In fact, the current tools-of-choice for
nanotechnology research are computers, as well as Scanning Tunneling Microscopes and Atomic Force Microscopes, which are inexpensive and are often homemade within laboratories doing the research.52
Thus, there are no large fuel-enrichment facilities (as with nuclear
weapons research), no unusual chemical precursors or feedstocks (as
with chemical weapons), and not even any odd organisms or nutrients
(as with biotechnology research) for investigators to discover in
searching for rogue labs.
Such signature items will naturally appear once nanotechnology
research and development advances sufficiently. However, by that
time it would be too late for a prohibitionist approach to have any
credibility. At present, and for some time, a nanotechnology research
program could easily be concealed within a wide range of electronic
or biotechnology-related projects, with no apparent giveaways. In the
absence of giveaway signature technologies, the only way in which a
prohibitionist approach is likely to succeed is if it (1) covers a broad
51. Luddism has been defined as “ intense dislike of or opposition to technological innovation.” 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 86 (2d ed. 1989).
52. See, e.g., Mitch Jacoby, STM: An All-In-One Tool, 77 CHEMISTRY & ENGINEERING
NEWS 48, at 9–10 (Nov. 29, 1999) (describing homemade Scanning Tunneling Microscopes), available at http://www.physics.uci.edu/~wilsonho/c&en112999.html; Metin Sitti
& Hideki Hashimoto, Controlled Pushing of Nanoparticles: Modeling and Experiments, 5
IEEE/ASME T RANSACTIONS ON MECHATRONICS 199 (June 2000) (describing homemade
Atomic Force Microscope system), available at http://robotics.eecs.berkeley.edu/~sitti/
papers/mechat_00.pdf.
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range of potentially nanotechnology-related fields, and (2) subjects
work in those areas to in-depth surveillance and regulation. Such efforts, however, are unlikely to be well-received.
A third difficulty is that, at the very least, a prohibition regime is
likely to create sizable bureaucratic demands for pre-approval of any
research that borders on the prohibited. The resulting bureaucratization of research and development will likely slow technical progress
substantially. Nonetheless, given the concealable nature of nanotechnology, as described above, it would be largely ineffective in preventing illicit research.
The biggest problem with a prohibitionist approach, however, is
that it must be both universal and perfect to be any good. Obviously, a
prohibitionist approach that successfully prevents all nanotechnology
research will prevent all harms that result from such research. However, a prohibitionist approach that prevents only 99.999% of
nanotechnology research, while allowing a few underground projects
sponsored by rogue states to slip through its net, would likely do just
as much harm with no corresponding benefits. Indeed, it would only
make things worse, because those rogue states would then have a monopoly on a powerful technology, while the civilized world would
lack the wherewithal to deploy countermeasures.53
Calls for a moratorium on nanotechnology research face similar
problems. Such calls for voluntary relinquishment are mostly attention-getting devices (as even their proponents admit 54 ), and are
unlikely to promote the regulation of the technology. It is conceivable
that a moratorium on some specific aspects of nanotechnology that
raise particular questions might be appropriate at some time in the
future — as it was with early biotechnology research55 — but at this
point a research moratorium would more likely keep us in the dark
than keep us safe.
The prohibitionist approach is unlikely to carry the day. The
drawbacks are too great, the advantages too few, and the difficulties
too involved. 56

53. Cf. DANIEL R. HEADRICK, THE TOOLS OF EMPIRE (1981) (describing the role of key
technologies in ensuring European military supremacy).
54. Barnaby J. Feder, From Nanotechnology’s Sidelines, One More Warning, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2003, at C1 (quoting moratorium proponent as saying “it gets people’s attention”).
55. See infra Part III.C.1.
56. This Article does not address the constitutional problems with such regulation —
both in terms of the First Amendment, and in terms of limitations on Congressional power
over things that are not clearly interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598 (2000) (lack of power under Commerce Clause for challenged Congressional
legislation); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (same). For more on this topic, see
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or What if the
Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 W IS. L. REV.
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B. Restriction to the Military Sphere
One regulatory approach short of outright prohibition is to keep
nanotechnology research within the classified military realm. Such an
effort might consist of:
• Large amounts of classified research, which would tend to draw
nanotechnology researchers into the military sphere;
• Legislation, somewhat like the Atomic Energy Act,57 making
private research cumbersome and difficult, and specifying that
some sorts of nanotechnology would be “born classified” regardless of source; and
• The use of informal guidance, export control laws, government
contracting, and other measures to retard the growth of the civilian nanotechnology sector relative to the military nanotechnology
sector — as has been done in the past for areas such as encryption 58 and certain telecommunications technologies.59
1. The Case for “Painting It Black”
The government might choose to pursue a strategy of classific ation because the stakes are high and it might work for a time. In the
nineteenth century, technologies like steam navigation, repeating firearms, and high explosives gave the Western powers virtually unchallenged supremacy throughout the rest of the world.60 Nanotechnology
could play a similar role in the twenty-first century. Thus, it is easy to
see why such a role might appeal to military planners and, perhaps, to
those worried about the social implications (e.g., extended lifespans or
drastic body modifications) of civilian nanotechnology.
The military uses of nanotechnology are likely to be plentiful and
important. Nanotechnology might permit devices ranging from pervasive, hard-to-detect battlefield sensors,61 to brain modifications that

369. See also John A. Robertson, The Scientist’s Right to Research: A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL . L. REV. 1203, 1217–18 (1977).
57. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2281. See also infra text accompanying notes 65–68.
58. See Vandana Pednekar-Magal & Peter Shields, The State and Telecom Surveillance
Policy: The Clipper Chip Initiative, 8 COMM. L. & POL’ Y 429 (2003) (discussing federal
government’s attempt to use a combination of purchasing and regulatory power to prevent
spread of unsanctioned encryption technology).
59. See id .
60. See generally HEADRICK , supra note 53.
61. See Scott Pace, Military Implications of Nanotechnology, FORESIGHT UPDATE 6, Aug.
1, 1989, at 2 (“In low-intensity warfare, intelligent sensors and barrier systems could isolate
or channel guerrilla movements depending on the local terrain.”), available at
http://www.foresight.org/Updates/Update06/Update06.2.html.
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enhance soldiers’ cognitive skills, 62 to artificial “disease” agents that
could hide undetected in the bodies of enemy populations or leaders
until triggered by external stimuli. Indeed, sophisticated nanodevices
could even manipulate neurotransmitter levels within the brains of
individuals or populations, producing the ultimate weapon in psychological warfare. Israelis and Palestinians might be induced to love one
another like brothers, but populations might similarly be induced to
love Big Brother. Furthermore, military nanotechnologies are partic ularly appealing because they may be cleaner, safer, and less likely to
cause collateral damage than current technologies.63
2. Problems with Military Classific ation
The promise of such technologies is surely hard for military planners to resist. This also means that military planners will want to deny
access to potential adversaries. In practice, given the tendency of
technology to spread, this means denying it to almost everyone outside the military. For example, the military and intelligence establishment has tried for decades to limit the availability of encryption
technology to non-military entities and individuals.64
Similarly, in atomic weapons technology, some information is described as “born classified,” meaning that disclosure is forbidden from
the moment of discovery.65 For example, consider the following anecdote, which demonstrates how troublesome such an environment can
be:

62. See, e.g., Kelly Hearn, Future Soldiers Could Get Enhanced Minds, UPI, Mar. 19,
2001, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (describing planned use of nanotechnology to enhance soldiers’ cognition and decision-making under stress).
63. See Pace, supra note 61 (describing the potential relative advantages of nanotechnology and “smart munitions” in various forms of warfare). Pace observes that:
Rather than requiring nuclear weapons to attack massive conventional
forces or distant, hard targets, nanotechnology enhancements to
cruise missiles and ballistic missiles could allow them to destroy their
targets with conventional explosives. Conventional explosives themselves might be replaced by molecular disassemblers that would be
rapidly effective, but with less unintended destruction to surrounding
buildings and populations. . . . Nanoweapons could lower the cost of
meeting aggression (in both dollars and lives) in tactical applications
while preserving strategic deterrence without nuclear weapons.
Id.
64. Indeed, similar efforts continue. See Dan Froomkin & Amy Branson, Deciphering
Encryption, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (describing law enforcement restrictions against exporting encryption technology), at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/
encryption/encryption.htm (last updated May 8, 1998).
65. See generally Richard G. Hewlett, ‘Born Classified’ in the AEC: A Historian’s View,
BULL . ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Dec. 1981, at 20–27 (pointing out that this policy became more
problematic when American companies wanted to start research into gas centrifuge processes that European companies had already begun).
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A small company that had never had any involvement with the atomic energy program, nor any government contracts at all, sought to patent an
invention. . . . The company’s executives were
stunned to learn that their invention included a
highly classified concept critical to the production of
fissionable material. They were equally stunned to
learn that the Atomic Energy Act prohibited their
continued access to their own invention unless all
relevant personnel were investigated and cleared.66
And, in a similarly curious incident:
In late 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission general
manager received a letter from a prominent scientist
who had been an important figure in the wartime
atomic bomb project. The letter stated that the writer
had been out of the atomic energy program since
1948, but had been doing some calculations concerning nuclear weapons in his own laboratory. He was
certain, he said, based on his knowledge of the
atomic weapons program, that his calculations had
produced information that would be highly classified
had it been developed within the government program. Accordingly, he was asking the Commission
to provide him with a security-approved, three-way
combination safe in which he could store the sensitive information he had created so as to protect it
against leakage to unauthorized persons.
This letter threw the Commission and the Department of Justice into turmoil, because the scientist did
not have security clearance and, therefore, it was
unlawful for him to have created Restricted Data or
to have access to the data. Moreover, the situation
could not be remedied since he was regarded as “unclearable.”67
The difficulties created by such a regime are rather obvious, and they
would be more serious in the current context of nanotechnology because of the lower threshold for experimentation, the more wide-

66. Harold P. Green, ‘Born Classified’ in the AEC: A Legal Perspective, BULL. ATOM.
SCIENTISTS, Dec. 1981, at 29.
67. Id.
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spread nature of the technical knowledge, and the greater sensitivity
these days toward scientific freedom and free speech generally.
While the Atomic Energy Act was an extreme case, it was not the
only means by which the federal government attempted to limit the
spread of scientific and technical knowledge. During the Cold War,
other “sensitive” technological information was subjected to stringent
restrictions such as pre-publication review requirements and limitations on international data-sharing.68
Were such efforts successful? Given that we won the Cold War,
much has been forgiven, but as recently as the 1980s most scientists
believed controls on scientific information were overly strict and were
doing more harm than good.69 Even some military experts fear that
keeping nanotechnology under wraps via military classification would
be a mistake. Not only would it undermine the civilian economy, but
it would push research underground. As Admiral David Jeremiah
writes:
Somewhere in the back of my mind I still have this
picture of five smart guys from Somalia or some
other nondeveloped nation who see the opportunity
to change the world. To turn the world upside down.
Military applications of molecular manufacturing
have even greater potential than nuclear weapons to
radically change the balance of power. In anticipation of that possibility the uninformed policymaker is
likely to impose restrictions on development of technology in such a way as to inhibit commercial development (ultimately beneficial to mankind) while
permitting those operating outside the restrictive
bounds to gain an irrevocable advantage. 70
In terms of undesirables developing a secret technological advantage, the comparative risk is admittedly less under the military classification regime than under the outright prohibition regime (i.e.,
“mere” disadvantage in the former versus utter helplessness in the
latter), but the remaining risk is clearly still significant.
Also, there is the risk that military nanotechnologies, by their
very nature, will be more dangerous than civilian nanotechnologies,
since civilian technologies tend to be more robust and founded on a
68. For a concise history, see Edward Gerjuoy, Controls on Scientific Information Exports, 3 YALE L. & POL ’Y REV. 447 (1985).
69. See id .
70. David E. Jeremiah, Nanotechnology and Global Security, Presentation at the Fourth
Foresight Institute Conference on Molecular Nanotechnology (Nov. 9, 1995), available at
http://www.zyvex.com/nanotech/nano4/jeremiahPaper.html.
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much deeper experience base than military technologies.71 A civilian
nanotechnology sphere will allow many bugs to be worked out in the
open, and permit more safety oversight than a classified military program. Thus, classification of all nanotechnology research is likely to
make military nanotechnology both more dangerous and less reliable
than would otherwise be the case.
Military monopolization of nanotechnology also poses political
risk. Nanotechnology is likely to have dramatic nonmilitary applic ations, ranging from enhanced computing power to a cure for cancer
and old age. A military monopoly on nanotechnology would either
cause society at large to forego those benefits, or — perhaps worse —
place those benefits under the control of Pentagon bureaucrats. Given
that the “military-industrial complex” already wields significant
power via purchasing and pork,72 do we want it to be able to offer
political supporters access to secret age-reversing treatments or disease cures? Though such prospects might sound like the plot to a bestselling techno-thriller, a military monopoly on nanotechnology might
make them a reality or, at the least, give rise to fears and rumors that
might prove equally destructive to democracy.
C. Modest Regulation and Robust Civilian Research
If nanotechnology is not outlawed altogether or limited to military
applications, then we must look to other models. Some research, of
course, is largely unregulated except with regard to generally applic able laws having to do with safety (e.g., research into laser technology). Nanotechnology regulation could follow the same idea, but its
potential dangers make such an approach politically unlikely, regardless of its merits.73
A more plausible alternative is a modest form of regulation coupled with robust civilian research — an approach that has been applied successfully to biotechnology, or “recombinant DNA” research,
as it used to be called. Though some have criticized the regulatory
regime governing biotechnology as overly intrusive, it has largely
prevented misuse, maintained public confidence, and allowed science
to proceed (yielding many new drugs and treatments). In fact, it has
71. This characteristic is even more pronounced when the manufacturing or coding standards are open, which is why open source software is generally more reliable and robust
than proprietary closed source software. This lesson has not been lost on nanotechnology
enthusiasts. See BRYAN BRUNS, OPEN SOURCING NANOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS, at http://www.foresight.org/Conferences/MNT8/
Papers/Bruns/index.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2003).
72. See GORDON ADAMS, THE POLITICS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING : THE I RON T RIANGLE (1981) (describing mutually-reinforcing relationship among Congress, the Pentagon,
and defense contractors).
73. See supra Part III.A.1.
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also created an entirely new high-technology industry sector.74 As one
might expect, this approach is championed by those who believe the
benefits of nanotechnology justify development in the field (e.g., scientists, advocates for the seriously ill, et cetera).
1. Early Biotechnology Regulation
In the early 1970s, when it became apparent that genetic modifications were becoming feasible, some scientists became worried about
the potential dangers. Scientist Paul Berg began doing research involving tumor viruses and E. coli that some feared might conceivably
create infectious forms of cancer.75 Others began to discuss the risks
posed by transfering genes across species lines.76 Berg agreed to defer
his experiment until the questions were addressed.
Over 100 scientists met and discussed these issues at the “Asilomar I Conference” in 1973. 77 Later that year, at the Gordon Research
Conference, several leading scientists agreed that the issue deserved
more attention and drafted a letter to the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) and the National Institute of Medicine; soon after, the
letter was published in the journal Science. 78 Subsequently, in a press
conference held at NAS headquarters, scientists agreed that research
in certain potentially dangerous areas should not progress until the
subject had been studied. This was followed by another letter to Science (and to the British journal Nature) explicitly calling for a moratorium on experiments that might develop deadly bacteria or viruses.79
The moratorium was generally observed until the scientists met
again in 1975 at “Asilomar II” to develop more detailed guidelines, 80
which later became official government regulations covering biotech-

74. See generally Joseph M. Rainsbury, Biotechnology on the RAC — FDA/NIH Regula tion of Human Gene Therapy, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 575 (2000); Charles Weiner, Is SelfRegulation Enough Today?: Evaluating the Recombinant DNA Controversy, 9 HEALTH
MATRIX 289 (1999).
75. See MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF A SPECIES IN 23 CHAPTERS
244-45 (1999); see also DONALD S. FREDRICKSON , THE RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY , A MEMOIR : SCIENCE , P OLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 1974–1981 (2001);
Judith P. Swazey et al., Risks and Benefits, Rights and Responsibilities: A History of the
Recombinant DNA Research Controversy, 51 S. CAL . L. REV. 1019 (1978).
76. See RIDLEY , supra note 75.
77. For a good, near-contemporaneous summary of these events, see Swazey et al., supra
note 75. See also FREDRICKSON , supra note 75 (providing a more recent overview).
78. Maxine Singer & Dieter Soll, Letter to the Editor: Guidelines for DNA Hybrid Molecules, 181 SCIENCE 1114 (1973).
79. Paul Berg et al., Letter to the Editor, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974). See also Swazey, supra note 77, at 1022–26.
80. See Swazey et al., supra note 77, at 1025–36; see also Roger B. Dworkin, Science,
Society and the Expert Town Meeting: Some Comments on Asilomar, 51 S. CAL. L. REV.
1471 (1978).

** DRAFT **
Do not reference - formatting and pagination
may not correspond to printed version

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=962589

No. 1]

Nanotechnology and Regulatory Policy

199

nology research funded by the National Institutes of Health (“NIH”).81
These guidelines have been modified as experience demonstrated that
concerns about safety were generally overblown.82 However, they
remain sufficiently prestigious that many companies voluntarily subject their work to NIH guidelines and review,83 and standard licensing
agreements even call for such voluntary compliance. 84
2. Evaluating the Biotechnology Model
Overall, it is fair to call the regime for regulating civilian biotechnology a success. First, of course, the horrible scenarios envisioned by
early critics (e.g., epidemics of cancer-bearing E. coli) have neither
materialized nor turned out to be a real threat.85 Second, the biotechnology industry has grown and flourished, and although industry
members no doubt would prefer less regulation, it has not been strangled in its crib.
That success, of course, has its downsides, as some writers have
observed, because it has limited public discussion:
Perhaps as a result of the success of industry
self-regulation of rDNA, there was very little public
discussion of GM [genetically modified] products in
the 1980s and early 1990s. . . .
Measurable public concern about the technology
did not emerge in the United States until the late
1990s — well after varieties of soy, cotton, and corn
had been introduced into American agriculture —

81. Decision of the Director, National Institutes of Health To Release Guidelines for Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (July 7, 1976).
82. See Weiner, supra note 74 (describing confidentiality issues raised by widespread
voluntary compliance and general fading of safety concerns with experience).
83. See id .
84. See, e.g., 3 ROBERT GOLDSCHEIDER, ECKSTROM’ S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS: T HE FORMS AND SUBSTANCE OF L ICENSING § 12:2 (2003) (calling for
licensee to comply with NIH guidelines).
85. For a discussion of how early critics’ fears have failed to materialize, see Glenn
Harlan Reynolds, Research and Risks, TECH CENT. STATION (July 31, 2002), at
http://www.techcentralstation.com/073102B.html. For example, while the then-mayor of
Cambridge, Massachussetts, once expressed apprehension that genetic engineering would
lead to “Frankenstein -type microbes coming out of the sewers,” such early concerns today
“seem almost quaint [since] even high school biology classes . . . do the same gene combining experiments that once struck fear into the hearts of public officials and private citizens.”
Gene Therapy: Medicine for Your Genes (National Public Radio broadcast, 1998) (transcript), availa ble at http://www.dnafiles.org/PDFs/therapy.pdf .
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and only after the issue had become a political force
in Europe. 86
The result, interestingly, was that the lobby opposing genetically
modified foods was able to capitalize on the lack of public discussion
and seize the initiative, something that probably harmed the future of
many biotechnology-related products.87
In addition, self-regulatory regimes — just like government-run
regulatory regimes — require modification to stay up to date. It is
likely that new developments will require a second look at the regime
for biotechnology regulation as the technology advances and as tools
become cheaper. For example, it is now possible for scientists to synthesize viruses, whether beneficial or dangerous, in ordinary laboratories using off-the-shelf technology, 88 and the dangers posed by this
development are, perhaps, even more immediate than those posed by
nanotechnology.89 Fortunately, however, the same technological developments are likely to make the countering of such threats easier.
One expert summed it up as follows: “This kind of knowledge is
really going to generate all kinds of benefits, but I also think the bioscience community is going to have to take responsibility for creating
and maintaining institutions for responsibly managing this knowledge.”90
In any case, the drawbacks sketched out here are less significant
for our purposes since (a) nanotechnology is already being — and
seems unlikely to stop being — hotly debated in public fora, and (b)
nanotechnology is still in its infancy — or, at most, only toddling.
Therefore, the modest regulatory regime, which has successfully allowed biotechnology to thrive in its early stages without realizing a
parade of horribles, seems to provide, in contrast to the two regulatory
possibilities previously considered, 91 the most promising model for
nanotechnology regulation.
86. Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified
Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. REV. 733, 743 (2003). See also D.L. Uchtmann, Sta rlink™: A Case Study of Biotechnology Agricultural Regulation, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 159
(2002).
87. See Marden, supra note 86 at 753–58.
88. See Scientists Synthesize New Organism, WASH . TIMES, Nov. 14, 2003, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20031113-124041-8941r.htm
(describing
synthesis of a phage, a benign virus that infects only bacteria).
89. See Rick Weiss, Researchers Create Virus in Record Time: Organism Not Dangerous
to Humans, WASH . POST, Nov. 14, 2003, at A10 (quoting Eckard Wimmer, the scientist
who “painstakingly stitched together” the polio virus two years ago , as saying that “[y]ou
could use [this new] technology to make HIV in two weeks.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38211-2003
Nov13.html.
90. Id. (quoting Tara O'Toole, Director of the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center's
Center for Biosecurity, in Baltimore, Maryland) (internal quotation marks omitted).
91. See supra Part III.A (prohibition); supra Part III.B (classification).
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IV. LESSONS FOR NANOTECHNOLOGY
As should be clear by now, even though outlawing nanotechnology is likely to prove impossible and counterproductive, lawmakers
need not be resigned to inaction. Indeed, the biotechnology experience
suggests that a combination of self-regulation combined with government coordination and monitoring can answer legitimate safety
concerns while allowing research to flourish. In fact, proper regulation
offers the prospect of minimiz ing nanotechnology’s risks, while
maximizing its potential benefits. There are several key areas of regulation, each with its own appropriate regime.
A. Research
Regulation of research might be justified on two grounds. First,
some might advocate regulating nanotechnology research for fear of
the knowledge that might result — a suggestion already put forth by
Bill Joy.92 Such regulation is unlikely to succeed, not only for lack of
consensus on what kinds of knowledge are undesirable, but also for
fairly obvious First Amendment reasons.93 While the degree of First
Amendment protection enjoyed by scientific research as such is not
entirely clear, regulation of research solely in order to ban the acquisition of knowledge seems rather dubious. In regulating research in order to forbid knowledge, after all, the government is really aiming at
knowledge itself.94
The second ground for regulating research, however, is stronger.
Regardless of the knowledge that it may or may not yield, the government can certainly regulate research for safety.95 For nanotechnology, this chiefly means ensuring that research with self-replicating
systems (replicators) is conducted under conditions that ensure none
will escape the laboratory, and that if such escape did occur, the replicators would be unable to reproduce in the wild. Aside from obvious
containment measures, such safety regulations might specify, for ex92. See Scheinin, supra note 45, at 1F (noting that “[Joy] said not knowing everything
there is to know ‘may have group benefit as well’”).
93. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
94. See generally Steven Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO . L.J. 1341 (1987). See also Steven Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of
American Science, 1979 U. ILL . L.F. 1 (1979) (arguing that Constitution protects scientific
research); Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo and Government: Toward
Constitutional Protection for Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH . L. REV. 349 (1978) (same);
Robertson, supra note 56 (same). But see Stephen L. Carter, The Bellman, the Snark, and
the Biohazard Debate, 3 YALE L. & P OL ’Y REV. 358, 369–73 (1985) (questioning whether
the First Amendment protects research).
95. See Valerie M. Fogleman, Regulating Science: An Evaluation of the Regulation of
Biotechnology Research, 17 ENVTL . L. 183, 185–87 (discussing regulatory and First
Amendment issues).

** DRAFT **
Do not reference - formatting and pagination
may not correspond to printed version

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=962589

202

Harvard Journal of Law & Technology

[Vol. 17

ample, that important parts of the replicators’ blueprints for reproduction depend on elements not found in the natural environment. Such
an approach, in fact, is consistent with the “physical containment” and
“biological containment” approaches taken to the regulation of biotechnology.96
B. Beyond the Lab
The real problem with nanotechnology, however, is not accident,
but abuse.97 Thus, regulation of nanotechnology must focus more on
preventing deliberate destructive uses of nanotechnology rather than
preventing accidents. This is likely to involve several complementary
approaches.
1. Access Limitation
One approach, employed in other areas, would be to only allow
licensed dependable professionals to work with nanotechnology, or at
least those nanotechnologies deemed particularly risky (e.g., generalpurpose self-replicating devices, which might be easier to reprogram
in destructive ways98 ). Such an approach parallels the treatment of
explosives and toxic substances and might offer some benefits, but at
best the protection would be incomplete. 99 Just as restrictions on high
explosives are evaded through the use of expedients like fueloil/fertilizer mixes, or through theft, bribery, and blackmail, restrictions on nanotechnology access can be evaded or neutralized by morethan-casual offenders.
2. Export Controls
Similarly, one might attempt to limit the spread of nanotechnology to hostile or irresponsible nation-states through export controls,
an approach that has proven modestly effective in some areas. Nuclear
programs, in particular, are easy to control because they require a
large and conspicuous physical plant, need significant quantities of
rare fissionable materials, and make use of equipment that was, until

96. “Physical containment” means precautions against escape from laboratories; “biological containment” involves ensuring that organisms used for research cannot survive
outside the lab. See Swazey et al., supra note 77, at 1044–45.
97. See DREXLER ET AL., UNBOUNDING THE FUTURE , supra note 16, at 254.
98. Being more flexible, they would be analogous to personal computers, which are more
susceptible to backing and reprogramming than specialty “embedded” systems like those in
automobile engines or toasters.
99. See generally Alan Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast Terrorism: A
Legal Survey of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 67 TENN. L. REV. 177 (1999).
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recently, specialized in nature and easy to control. 100 Nanotechnology
does not possess these characteristics to nearly as great a degree, 101
and may be compared more accurately to less-conspicuous biological
programs.
3. Professional Ethics
The single most successful example of technology control in the
last century was the regulatory regime established for biotechnology.102 What is interesting about this approach is that it was largely
“soft law,” more the product of professional self-regulation, culture,
and expectations than of harsh regulatory systems. Applying this approach to nanotechnology has a number of advantages. First, if the
nanotechnology community in general can be imbued with positive
values, this approach produces a large number of “regulators” who
can identify and respond to improper conduct that governmental authorities would be unlikely to notice. Second, if such an approach is
regarded as morally binding by large numbers of people in the field, it
is likely to be obeyed even under circumstances where formal legal
controls would be unable to operate. 103 Third, such attitudes are likely
to be self-reinforcing, spreading from those initially adopting the attitude to cow orkers. In total, while this approach is not sufficient in
itself, it appears to offer many advantages.
4. Inherent Safety
The various implementations of nanotechnology could be required to be inherently safe (i.e., resistant to accident, misuse, and
abuse). For example, the “genome” of replicating nanodevices might
be encrypted to make reprogramming more difficult and to ensure that
“mutations” would lead to nonsense instructions; there might be lim itations on the number of generations that a device could reproduce;
software could be configured so that changes would produce an audit
trail; and certain types of programming or operations might be prohibited. If such protections are built into the most basic elements of
nanotechnology, they would probably be effective at preventing accidents, and helpful (though not insuperable) in preventing abuse. Furthermore, as previously suggested, an open source approach to
100. However, this approach has not stopped North Korea, India, and P akistan from develo ping nuclear weapons programs. See FED . OF AM. SCIENTISTS, STATES POSSESSING ,
PURSUING OR CAPABLE OF ACQUIRING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION , at
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/wmd_state.htm (last updated July 29, 2000).
101. See supra text accompanying note 52.
102. See supra Part III.C.1–2.
103. Such cultural norms, or “soft law,” are, for example, why we wash our hair and
mow our lawns, and are likely more effective than formal laws at ensuring such behavior.
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nanotechnology architectures might be helpful in producing systems
that are robust and resistant to abuse, 104 though this may conflict to
some degree with other control approaches.
C. Evaluating the Options
In evaluating these and other regulatory approaches, it will be important to maintain a proper perspective. Many of the gross dangers
posed by nanotechnology (e.g., the runaway proliferation of hostile
self-replicating devices) will not really be all that new. Disease organisms, after all, are hostile self-replicating devices, and we have been
dealing with their threat — and with the threat of deliberate human
modification of such organisms to enhance their deadliness — for
some time. Indeed, crude biological weapons (and some that are not
so crude) have been possessed by many nations for decades without
being put into significant military use. This should be comforting.
Moreover, it is important to recognize that the choice is not simply between stepping on the accelerator or on the brake. Stopping
nanotechnology through regulation is effectively m
i possible. 105 The
choice is not “will this technology be developed at all? ” but rather
“what can we do to ensure that this technology develops in a benign
fashion?” Regulators must exercise as much care against unintended
consequences as scientists, because in actual experience, regulation
leads to Frankensteinian results far more often than does science.106
Scholars of administrative law have long recognized the existence
of what Cass Sunstein calls “paradoxes of the regulatory state.”107
Such paradoxes occur when regulation is self-defeating, something
that happens more often than is generally understood. The following
are a few examples of this phenomenon that may be particularly applic able to the regulation of nanotechnology.

104. See discussion supra note 71.
105. See supra Part III.A.
106. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s requirement of MTBE as a
fuel additive to promote clean air has led to serious groundwater pollution problems. CONG .
RESEARCH SERV., MTBE IN GASOLINE : CLEAN AIR AND DRINKING W ATER I SSUES (2001),
available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Air/air-26.cfm. Similarly, as Malcolm Gladwell has reported, the decision to require airbags in passenger vehicles was driven more by
regulatory ideology than by science and, though expensive to implement, it may well have
cost more lives than it has saved. Malcolm Gladwell, Wrong Turn: How the Fight to Make
America’s Highways Safer Went Off Course, NEW YORKER, June 11, 2001, at 52–61. Other
examples follow in the text.
107. Cass J. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 407, 407
(1990).
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1. Overregulation Produces Underregulation
When regulations are especially aggressive, administrators will
tend not to enforce them; when statutes require especially stringent
regulations, administrators will tend not to issue regulations at all. For
example, extraordinarily strict rules on workplace toxins have have
led the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (“OSHA”) to
fail in addressing all but a tiny minority of suspected toxic chemicals.108 The burden on OSHA, and the industry, would simply be too
great if more suspected toxins were controlled. In general, “[a] crazy
quilt pattern of severe controls in some areas and none in others is the
predictable consequence of a statute that forbids balancing and tradeoffs.”109
2. Stringent Regulation of New Risks Can Increase Aggregate Risk
Levels
New technologies are usually safer than old ones, but for political
reasons it is easier to impose regulations on new technologies rather
than on entrenched industries. Paradoxically, this can actually make
things more dangerous. Requiring that new automobiles be much
cleaner, and thus more expensive, has the effect of encouraging people to drive old environmentally-unfriendly automobiles longer. As
Professor Sunstein notes:
The strategy of imposing costs exclusively on new sources or
entrants . . . will discourage the addition of new sources and
encourage the perpetuation of old ones. The problem is not
merely that old risks will continue, but that, precisely because
of regulatory programs, those risks will become more common and last longer than they otherwise would.110
3. To Require the Best Available Technology Is to Retard
Technological Development
If the government requires companies to employ the best available technology, it creates a disincentive for companies to develop
new technologies, because they will be forced to adopt the results
whether they want to or not. “Perversely, requiring adoption of the
[best available technology] eliminates the incentive to innovate at all,

108. See id. at 414 (“ Of the many toxic substances in the workplace, OSHA has controlled only ten.”).
109. Id. at 416.
110. Id. at 417.
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and indeed creates disincentives for innovation by imposing an economic punishment on innovators.”111
These paradoxes of regulation suggest some specific regulatory
approaches that should be avoided. Generally, they caution regulators
to move incrementally, lest they aggravate the problems they are trying to address. Experience certainly demonstrates that such unintended consequences are not to be dismissed.112
D. The Foresight Guidelines on Molecular Nanotechnology
With these sorts of concerns in mind, and with the Asilomar experience as a guide, the Foresight Institute conducted a workshop in
the spring of 1999 aimed at drafting a set of guidelines for the ethical
use of nanotechnology.113 The conference, including individuals from
the scientific, defense, environmental, and legal communities, undertook considerable discussion of the proper approach for nanotechnology regulation before producing the draft guidelines. Since its
development, the draft has been subject to criticism and revision in an
effort to identify flaws and reach consensus. The Guidelines draft is
available on the Foresight Institute’s website, which also provides
information on how to comment and propose revisions.114
The Foresight Guidelines are consciously modeled on the successful experience of biotechnology regulation.115 Like the biotechnology guidelines,116 they will no doubt be modified as experience
and scientific knowledge dictate. Indeed, the Foresight Guidelines are
more like guidelines for formulating regulations than regulations
themselves. The philosophy of the Guidelines is that the process of
regulating nanotechnology should be Hippocratic in nature (“first, do
no harm”), and that regulation should be ni cremental and based on
experience whenever feasible. If possible, self-regulation and culture
should be used in place of law, as those tools are more pervasive and
flexible in their applic ation.
Thus, the Guidelines include the following principle:

111. Id. at 420.
112. See discussion supra note 106.
113 See John Carroll, Nanotech’s Dark Side Debated in the Aftershock of Sept. 11,
SMALL T IMES, Nov. 2, 2001, at http://www.smalltimes.com/document_display.cfm?document_id=2485 (describing Monterey conference); Kenneth Chang, Can Robots Rule the
World? Not Yet, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at F1 (describing Guidelines).
114. See FORESIGHT INST., FORESIGHT GUIDELINES ON MOLECULAR NANOTECHNOLOGY
(2000), at http://www.foresight.org/guidelines/current.html.
115. Biotechnology regulation was successful because, as described above, it has allowed
great technical progress without significant dangers to public safety. See supra Part III.C.2.
116. See supra note 81.
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People who work in the MNT [molecular nanotechnology] field should develop and utilize professional
guidelines that are grounded in reliable technology,
and knowledge of the environmental, security, ethical, and economic issues relevant to the development
of MNT.117
In addition, the Foresight Guidelines include some more specific
development principles:
1. Artificial replicators must not be capable of replication in a natural, uncontrolled environment.
2. Evolution within the context of a self-replicating
manufacturing system is discouraged.
3. Any replicated information should be error free.
4. MNT device designs should specifically limit
proliferation and provide traceability of any replicating systems.
5. Developers should attempt to consider systematically the environmental consequences of the
technology, and to limit these consequences to
intended effects. This requires significant research on environmental models, risk management, as well as the theory, mechanisms, and
experimental designs for built-in safeguard systems.
6. Industry self-regulation should be designed in
whenever possible. Economic incentives could
be provided through discounts on insurance
policies for MNT development organizations
that certify Guidelines compliance. Willingness
to provide self-regulation should be one condition for access to advanced forms of the technology.
7. Distribution of molecular manufacturing development capability should be restricted, whenever
possible, to responsible actors that have agreed
to use the Guidelines. No such restriction need
apply to end products of the development process that satisfy the Guidelines.118
These guidelines and principles are, obviously, only a start (just
as the guidelines produced by the Asilomar conferences were only a
117. FORESIGHT INST., supra note 114.
118. Id.
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start), but they do point the way toward a promising regulatory approach — an approach that will avoid the dangers of prohibition, and
the political difficulties of a laissez-faire regime.
Their existence is valuable not only as guidance, but also as innoculation. Historically, Congress tends to “discover” a new technology in response to hyperbolic media attention, often moving rapidly
(but injudiciously) in response to perceived public pressure.119 The
presence of widespread forethought on the subject will help to ensure
that, should such a spasm of regulatory interest appear, it will be constrained and informed by a well-developed base of knowledge and
reflection.
The good news is that people are thinking ahead. Even some environmental groups recognize that efforts to ban nanotechnology are a
bad idea. Greenpeace recently commissioned a study by researchers at
Imperial College in London that, in fact, characterizes a nanotechnology moratorium called for by other groups as “unpractical and probably damaging.” 120 The report also warns (in my view, correctly) that
such a moratorium may nonetheless be imposed if the sort of selfregulation described in the Foresight Guidelines does not take
place. 121
Nanotechnology researcher Vicki Colvin of Rice University recently made a similar point in her Congressional testimony:
In fact, I argue that the lack of sufficient public scientific data on GMOs [genetically modified organisms], whether positive or negative, was a
controlling factor in the industry’s fall from favor.
The failure of the industry to produce and share information with public stakeholders left it illequipped to respond to GMO detractors. This industry went, in essence, from “wow” to “yuck” to
119. For example, one study — purporting to analyze pornography on the internet —
later became the basis for a sensational Time magazine cover story. See Philip ElmerDeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn , T IME, July 3, 1995, at 38 (discussing Marty
Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Information Superhighway: A Survey of 917,410
Images, Descriptions, Short Sto ries, and Animations Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by
Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries, Provinces, and Territories, 83 GEO. L.J.
1849 (1995)). Even though Rimm’s study was later discredited, the Time story is generally
regarded as providing the impetus for passage of the Communications Decency Act. See
Heather L. Miller, Strike Two: An Analysis of the Child Online Protection Act’s Consitutional Failures, 52 FED . COMM. L.J. 155, 156 (1999).
120. See ALEXANDER H. ARNALL , FUTURE TECHNOLOGIES, TODAY ’ S CHOICES:
NANOTECHNOLOGY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND ROBOTICS; A TECHNICAL , POLITICAL
AND INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF E MERGING T ECHNOLOGIES 44, at http://www.greenpeace.org.
uk/MultimediaFiles/Live/FullReport/5886.pdf (2003) (report for the Greenpeace Environmental Trust). The other groups include the Canadian ETC Group, whose morat orium call is
discussed in the Greenpeace report. Id.
121. See id.
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“bankrupt.” There is a powerful lesson here for
nanotechnology.
In contrast, the Human Genome Project provides a
good model for how an emerging technology can defuse potential controversy by addressing it in the
public sphere. Mapping of the human genome carries
with it many of the same potential concerns as do
other fields of genetic research. The increased availability of genetic information raises the potential for
loss of privacy, misuse by the police and insurance
companies, and discrimination by employers. The
founders of the Human Genome Project did not try
to bury these legitimate concerns by limiting public
discourse to the benefits of this new knowledge. Instead, they wisely welcomed and actively encouraged the debate from the outset by setting aside 5%
of the annual budget for a program to define and address the ethical, legal and other societal implications
of the project.122
Both the Greenpeace report and Colvin are right: discussion now
prevents problems later. Although there is a natural tendency among
the research and business communities to avoid the spotlight and discourage public discussion, experience suggests that such an approach
is generally misguided.

V. CONCLUSION
As nanotechnology continues to develop, it is likely that the debate over regulation will also evolve. Experience with biotechnology
indicates that early concerns about safety are likely to be overblown
and that an effective regulatory regime can be based on consensus and
self-regulation. Though there are likely to be some calls for a complete ban on nanotechnology, such a strategy will not succeed. Its unworkability means that such calls will probably come from antitechnology groups who command little political support. Similarly,
efforts to limit nanotechnology to military applications alone are
likely to face serious social, technical and political hurdles, as knowledge diffuses and as the public seeks access to potentially life-saving
technologies.
122. Nanotechnology Research and Development Act of 2003 before the House Comm.
on Science, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Vicki Colvin, Director, Center for Biological
and Environmental Nanotechnology), available at http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full03/apr09/colvin.htm.
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However, there will also be more responsible calls for regulation.
The conscientious commentators’ concerns can be met through a
regulatory approach that will not stifle the development of nanotechnology. Let us hope that the political system will approach these questions with wisdom, rather than arrogance.
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